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The "Bush Ghost" of
Africa: By Gene Flinter A half century (now 65 years) after World War II, Afrika Korps commander Erwin Rommel remains one of its most enduring and vividly recalled figures. But Germany's World War I "Bush Ghost" of Africa equaled - and at times surpassed - the "Desert Fox" in outmaneuvering and frustrating highly superior British and Commonwealth forces. What he and his officers and men accomplished with some 12,000 black colonial troops stands as one of military history's most remarkable (and unsung) accomplishments. In 1953, at the age of 83, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck made a return visit to Dar es Salaam, the capital of present-day Tanzania. Prior to 1962 Dar es Salaam had been the capital of German East Africa and subsequently British Tanganyika. Germany had acquired the territory as the result of an 1885 Anglo-German agreement. Upon recognizing Lettow-Vorbeck,
some of his old Askaris (native troops) hoisted him on their
shoulders. At the end of his visit they saluted him with
"Heia
Safari" and sang their old
marching song. Throughout more than four years of war,
Lettow-Vorbeck's small Schutztruppe (guard force) and
colonial natives had remained undefeated. Never numbering
more than 10 to 12 thousand troops and always vastly
outnumbered, this remarkable and unique little army finally
surrendered on Prior to World War I, German East Africa encompassed all of present-day Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. Its 384,180 square miles exceeded the size of Germany and France combined. Its borders ranged from Kenya-Uganda and Lake Victoria in the north; to the Congo, Rhodesia and Lake Tanganyika in the west; to Nyasaland (with Lake Nyasa) and Portuguese Mozambique in the south. The Indian Ocean presented a natural border in the east. In 1914, there were approximately eight million persons living in this area. They included fewer than 10,000 German and other European colonials. Aside from local police, Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck's command included about 300 German officers and 2,500 native Askari troops. Excepting steamship travel across the colony's lakes, transportation in the colony consisted of two railroads. They were the Northern Moshi line, which connected the second largest port, Tanga, to Moshi (close to Mt. Kilimanjaro) and the central railway connecting Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika. Just to the north of the German border, the British operated the Uganda Railway connecting Mombasa (the main British East African port) through Nairobi to Kisumu on Lake Victoria. In 1914, of all the colonial powers, the Germans appeared to treat the natives far better than their rivals. For the most part the other European powers in equatorial Africa, particularly the Portuguese, looked upon the native as savage and heathen. On the other hand, the Germans provided the East Africans education, hospitals and fair pay. Such had not always been the case. German rule was at first quite harsh, and an early 1900's rebellion was put down with severity. Shortly thereafter, reforms such as the above were introduced, with a marked improvement of relations with the natives. Although the small Askari troop was highly disciplined, its marksmanship and weapons were outdated. Of 14 companies (200 men per company), only three had modern rifles. The rest were armed with single shot 1871 vintage Mauser rifles. Similar to a revolutionary war musket, the Mauser gave off a cloud of black smoke every time it was fired. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1914, Lettow-Vorbeck trained his troops and auxiliary police forces in earnest. One advantage the Germans had was the use of several machine guns per company. The Askaris adapted themselves very well to the technique of using these weapons effectively in sweeping crossfire patterns. Von Lettow-Vorbeck traveled extensively throughout the colony, visiting isolated colonials and commands and the bush country itself. As a result, he became fully acclimated to his domain. At the core of Lettow-Vorbeck's force was, of course, his German personnel. In The Great War In Africa, author Byron Farwell states that they "were all picked men. The officers all had at least three years of service, were exceptionally fit, and had to be specially recommended. The other ranks were all volunteers with at least two years' service in the regular army; of good character and exceptional physique . . . " Throughout the war, whites would be assigned to black units and vice versa, working closely together in the field. Thus, under Germany's tricolor, they became the first integrated army in the history of modern warfare - some 35 years before President Harry Truman ordered the integration of the U.S. armed forces. What was the colonial position if war came to Europe? Dr. Heinrich Schnee, the governor and Lettow-Vorbeck's civilian superior, adhered to the Congo Act. The Congo Act was an 1885 gentlemen's agreement whereby all European countries competing for colonies in Africa promised each other neutrality in case of war. Dr. Schnee and a contingent of colonial plantation owners preferred peace at any cost, particularly with Britain, the best-guess potential enemy. Lettow-Vorbeck saw the situation differently. He knew that the colony, with its natural protected harbors, could become a refuge and supply point for German warships and raiders. Moreover, his command could tie down enormous numbers of enemy troops, which otherwise would have been deployed on European battlefields. The stage was set. Most of the fighting would occur in "bush" country that ranged from tall savanna grass and open spaces to dense jungle. Ominous animals such as lions and crocodiles were minor considerations when measured against lethal disease carriers such as tsetse flies, chiggers, fleas and ticks. Vast distances compounded the problem of troop movement through areas poorly mapped or totally uncharted. When Archduke Ferdinand was assassinated in June 1914, Governor Schnee pursued a course of non-intervention, and made preparations to observe neutrality. In the meantime, the German light cruiser SMS Königsberg, under Capt. Max Looff, set sail from Dar es Salaam on July 28, days before the outbreak of war. On August 6 it captured a 6,600 ton English steamer loaded with Ceylon tea. Meanwhile, Lettow-Vorbeck had
received telegrams announcing British and German
mobilizations. He withdrew his forces from Dar es Salaam and
consolidated his command at Moshi near Mt. Kilimanjaro.
While looking for Königsberg, two British On August 8, Von Lettow gave orders to one of his detachments to begin raids in the Kilimanjaro area, against railroads and telegraph stations. In the meantime Capt. Looff sank a British ship off Aden and the cruiser HMS Pegasus outside Zanzibar. He then scurried back to the protected Rufiji river delta in the southern area of the colony. The British couldn't come in and get him, but Looff couldn't make for open sea. Operating from the Royal Navy's base at the nearby island of Zanzibar, British ships had him bottled up. In the early fall of 1914, Lettow-Vorbeck began attacking British outposts in the Lake Victoria region. Although his Askaris fought superbly, the old Mauser rifles were no match against the more modern equipment of the British detachments. Then came the first large engagement at Tanga, where the British disembarked 8,000 second-rate and seasick Indian troops along with a small force of regulars. Their twin objectives consisted of destroying Lettow-Vorbeck's forces and capturing the second largest city in the colony. Initially it was defended by 400 Askaris under German command. British bungling and delays in disembarkation gave Lettow-Vorbeck time to begin reinforcing the local detachment. The small railroad from Moshi to Tanga was used extensively in this process. In the meantime, another small force was held back in the Kilimanjaro area to ward off British secondary attacks. Without much foresight the British force landed in a swampy, mosquito infested mangrove area near Tanga on November 3, 1914. The well entrenched German gunners opened fire at about 200 yards, launched bayonet attacks and inflicted overwhelming casualties on the enemy. General Arthur E. Aitken, the British commander, adopted a "Colonel Blimp" attitude, ignored his own intelligence, and grumbled about the worthlessness of the lowly "Huns" and "niggers." On November 4, at noon, the British attacked again in full force. But the intense heat and lingering sea sickness wore them to a frazzle. Once again Lettow-Vorbeck's machine gunners and snipers positioned in palm trees mowed down the attackers. Overwhelmed by casualties, the British forces withdrew; only to be attacked by a furious swarm of wild African bees. In fact, the action at Tanga has been called "The Battle of the Bees." The natives had fashioned hives out of hollow logs and hung them on tree branches. When rifle and machine gun fire smashed into the hives, masses of angry bees swarmed out. After several more futile attacks the British withdrew, leaving about 2,000 casualties (as opposed to less than 100 on the German side). More importantly, Lettow-Vorbeck was resupplied with the capture of hundreds of modern Enfield rifles, 16 machine guns, 600,000 rounds of ammunition and large amounts of other supplies. He quickly became a hero and received both local and national support; much to the chagrin of Dr. Schnee, who still wanted to surrender the colony to the British. Lord Kitchener was furious at this defeat. General Aitken was responsible to the Secretary of State for India. But as the supreme commander at the War Office in London, Kitchener broke Aitken to the rank of colonel and retired him at half pay. The British command was given to Brig. Gen. Richard Wapshare, another "Colonel Blimp," who liked many servants, good food and drink, but who was not up to the task before him. In fact, most of the British officers commanding Indian troops in Africa were criticized for missing too much the clubs, polo matches and afternoon teas with which they had so recently been forced to part. Byron Farwell pointed out that one of Britain's greatest problems throughout the southern Africa fighting was the lack of coordination. Few realize that the Colonial Service, the government of India and the War Office maintained separate armies. Farwell wrote that "When British regulars, Indian Army units, colonial volunteers and the King's African Rifles tried to work together there was more than a little confusion and frustration." After replenishing his stores, Lettow-Vorbeck realized that the colony would have to become self sufficient in order to survive a long term war. There would be little help from the Kaiser, thanks to the Royal Navy's command of the seas. And the colony would be subjected to continual assaults by superior enemy forces. The German commander's overall strategy was based on his desire to support the Kaiser by tying down as many enemy troops, naval forces, supplies, etc. as possible. Allied manpower and equipment required for southern African operations could not be thrown against the main German forces in Europe. German women's auxiliaries were formed, to weave cotton on looms for replacement uniforms and clothing. Tires were to be produced from local rubber and sulfur. Quinine substitutes necessary to stave off malaria (which struck Lettow-Vorbeck) were derived from local bark, and later from an imported Peruvian bark. This bark, with a horrible smell and taste, was concocted into a tea by the commander, which he ordered his troops to take. They promptly gave it the idiom of "Von Lettow's schnapps." However, the "tea" worked. In short, all necessary support items or their substitutes were to be produced locally. The commander also split his forces into units as small as patrols of eight to 12 men. They continued raising havoc along the Uganda railway and the Mt. Kilimanjaro region. (By agreement, the magnificent mountain had been placed just within German territory at the specific request of Kaiser Wilhelm.) In the west, other German-Askari forces were commanded by retired Major Gen. Kurt Wahle. To the south, Capt. Looff was tying up a large British naval contingent, which expected him to break out from the Rufiji delta area. Supply depots were set up throughout the colony. After Tanga, the Germans and Askaris won another victory at Longido, with a detachment under Maj. Georg Kraut. But superior British force drove the Germans from the Uganda railway (and out of British East Africa). In early 1915, they took over the town and fort at Jasin in German territory. Lettow-Vorbeck then began an assault against Jasin, which was held by a brigade of Kashmir Rifles, a well disciplined Indian force. Eventually the victor, Lettow-Vorbeck could not afford to continue fighting pitched battles of attrition, and sustaining casualties against an enemy that, overall, would always outnumber him many times over in terms of manpower. Lettow-Vorbeck returned to continue guerrilla attacks against the Uganda railway. There would be no more pitched battles, unless the German commander detected an overwhelming advantage beforehand. In the spring of 1915, Brig. Gen. Michael Tighe took over command of British forces from General Wapshare. In early 1915, Germany had sent out a blockade runner, the Rubens, to supply both Capt. Looff and the ground forces. With a stroke of luck, since most German blockade runners coming out of the Baltic were either destroyed or captured, the Rubens made it to its anchorage north of Tanga. However, the cruiser HMS Hyacinth found the ship (the British had broken the German code) and proceeded to shell her mercilessly. Remarkably, there were no casualties. The German crew was absorbed into Von Lettow-Vorbeck's forces. Believing the ship destroyed, the British commander sailed away. Von Lettow-Vorbeck's men salvaged most of its guns and munitions. However, vital coal necessary to allow the Königsberg to fight once again or to escape was ruined by seawater. Lettow-Vorbeck concluded that the Königsberg would not be able to return to sea. Therefore he wanted the ship's crew, its 10 4.1 inch guns (for conversion to field artillery), radios, machine guns and other equipment. Capt. Looff would not comply with this request. Meanwhile, the British Admiralty under Winston Churchill (he would subsequently lose his post due to the Gallipoli disaster) had dispatched orders to "get the Königsberg!" It took months for Admiral King-Hall to find the German raider, it having been cleverly concealed and camouflaged in the delta. Twenty four British warships and several aircraft were assigned to ferret out the German cruiser. Withdrawing several cruisers from the area, the Admiralty sent shallow draft, heavily armed "monitors" for the purpose of finding and sinking Capt. Looff's ship. In July 1915 two British monitors with eight-inch guns drew within range of the Königsberg and blasted the cruiser. It was abandoned, and Lettow-Vorbeck inherited 24 naval officers and 560 noncoms and enlisted men, plus 325 German Navy personnel from other ships. All 10 of Königsberg's heavy guns, plus machine guns and other equipment, were salvaged. Lettow-Vorbeck left the bulk of this force under Capt. Looff to defend Dar es Salaam. He then formed a new company under his direct command, composed of the remaining Germans. Their primary job was to construct and man mobile platforms for several of the naval guns. Although the British were mistakenly placed on the defensive by London after the Tanga, Longido and Jasin battles, in the summer of 1915 Gen. Tighe launched an attack on the German port of Bukoba on Lake Victoria. Outnumbered, the Germans withdrew, leaving behind a powerful radio transmitter. In the meantime, Lettow-Vorbeck continued to stage lightning attacks in the Mt. Kilimanjaro area. His continued presence so close to British East Africa finally resulted in a decision by London's Imperial War Committee to reinforce their East African forces with sizable units from Britain and South Africa. Both of these eventually came under the command of Gen. Jan Christian Smuts, the great Boer leader. Unfortunately for Lettow-Vorbeck, Smuts and his South Africans were as well versed as himself in African bush fighting. In the years since the Boer War had ended in 1902, Smuts had been converted from a bitter enemy to a great friend of Britain. To his advantage, however, Von Lettow-Vorbeck was also aware that the South Africans and their commanders believed in apartheid. Therefore they would not use black Askaris within their forces. Furthermore, neither the South Africans or the British had much experience with machine gun tactics, this being the one weapon which could cause enormous casualties. As time passed, Lettow-Vorbeck could usually forecast Gen. Smuts' battle plans. These usually involved attempts to flank and envelop the German forces during the course of launching a frontal assault. With their superior white forces, the Boers had surmised that Lettow-Vorbeck's command, consisting of nothing but a bunch of "coolies," would fold in a couple of weeks. Just prior to Smuts' arrival, Gen. Tighe convinced London to allow attack against the Germans at Mt. Oldorobo, a defense point near Mt. Kilimanjaro. By controlling this point, Lettow-Vorbeck had thwarted British plans to build a supply road from the west to the Indian Ocean. Oldorobo was defended by the Schultz Detachment, which had been reinforced to 1,200 men. The British attacked with a force of 6,000 composed of British, South African, Rhodesian and Indian troops. This Commonwealth force's artillery bombardment zeroed in on empty trenches. The Germans had retreated to positions farther up the mountain, where carefully camouflaged machine gun nests and two field guns were in place. On February 12, 1916, attacking head on, the Commonwealth soldiers were decimated. Gen. Smuts received news of the defeat 11 days later, when he arrived. South African casualties in this battle alone equaled 50 percent of those encountered in their 1914 conquest of German Southwest Africa. On March 8, 1916, Smuts again attacked Lettow-Vorbeck's main force of 6,000 with an army of 30,000. This force was split into two giant enveloping columns under the command of Gen. Tighe. Tighe would attack Taveta and Mt. Oldorobo while Brig. Gen. James M. Stewart was to cut off the Germans at Longido. In the meantime, observing the slow moving forces, the Germans disappeared like ghosts, except to post snipers at various ambush points. Lettow-Vorbeck retreated slowly to the Tanga area, having escaped the huge envelopment. Also in March of 1916, a blockade runner reached Lindi, a port in the southeastern corner of the German colony. The British shelled the ship, but not before its 1,500 ton cargo of sorely needed supplies was unloaded. The African climate and environment began to tell on the combatants. Smuts's command was continually held up by miles of thornbush thickets, sun-baked plains (which exhausted their water supplies), marauding rhino herds by day, treacherous lion prides by night and destructive giraffes and elephants. The latter two animal herds knocked over installations and destroyed telegraph lines. Next, tropical and monsoon rains arrived. Instant streams appeared amid flood conditions. Bridges were washed out. Not taking a moment's rest, Smuts sent his top Boer commander, Gen. Louis van Deventer, to cut the German Central Railway and split the colony in two. This time malaria, dysentery, blackwater fever and dreaded typhoid decimated the South Africans. The German-led Askaris were basically immune to these diseases, as were those white commanders and other ranks who had lived in East Africa for years. Moreover, the Germans dressed in the manner of African troops, with only their hands and heads exposed. The British uniform issue was shorts and short sleeve shirts, open at the neck. The mosquitoes and tsetse flies feasted on their miserable victims. German-Askaris ambushes consisted of rapid deployment of machine guns (on portable tripods), concealed by logs or trenches, with clear fields of fire for 200 yards or more. By the time Commonwealth troops collected themselves following these ambushes, their antagonists were gone, having melted back into their prechosen cover. Throughout the summer of 1916 Smuts's determined pursuit of the German-Askari troops extracted a frightful toll. His men were dying of disease, succumbing to the climate and being killed or wounded as the result of constant ambushes set up by the retreating Germans. Smuts gained control of the colony's two railroads, but could not defeat the "Bush Ghost." He brought in field mortars and Mills bombs (hand grenades), which proved effective on occasions when he could pin down some of Lettow-Vorbeck's detachments. On September 11, 1916, Lettow-Vorbeck once again checked Gen. Smuts, with a major ambush at Kisaki just north of the Rufiji river. Both the Königsberg guns and Askari bayonet charges were effective in the overpowering heat. But of far more concern to Gen. Smuts during this six month, 900-mile offensive was the loss of 59,000 out of 60,000 transport animals due to tsetse flies, heat exhaustion and thirst. Indian soldiers were dying at an alarming rate from disease. One of his own Boer regiments was reduced to 200 men from an initial force of 1,200. However, the British could draw upon seemingly inexhaustible reservoirs of colonial manpower. The "Bush Ghost" enjoyed no such luxury. Between October 1916 and January 1917, the British refitted themselves, knowing that they would have to continue their offensive into the mosquito infested, unhealthy Rufiji river delta area. Lettow-Vorbeck's men were living off the land, shooting elephants for meat and hippos for fat. As a student of fungi, Lettow-Vorbeck kept the cooks supplied with mushrooms. Occasionally mistakes were made during this foraging, and men were poisoned. At this point Lettow-Vorbeck was suffering from malaria, infected feet, chiggers and sand flies. He had lost his glasses. Bandages were made from bark. The commander kept a personal bicycle for patrols and reconnaissance. In one strange skirmish he could have killed Gen. Smuts, who was little more than 15 yards from him. However, very much in the manner of North Africa's "Desert Fox" in the next war, Lettow-Vorbeck held to the fast-fading code of chivalry. He either let prisoners go with a promise not to fight again, or took them with him (as in the battles of 1918 in Mozambique), knowing that they would perish if left unattended in the bush. To flank Lettow-Vorbeck, the British landed forces at Dar es Salaam, Kilwa and Undi. Wary of these flanking movements, detachments were sent to join forces with Capt. Looff to bottle up the landing parties. Smuts resumed the attack in January 1917. The Germans retreated, ingeniously planting self-made land mines and other booby traps along the way. Frustrated with his failure to capture the "Bush Ghost," Smuts was called back to London to represent South Africa at an Imperial Conference. In planning a retreat into the Rufiji delta area, Lettow-Vorbeck sent back all German dependents, wives, mistresses and camp followers. The order did not apply to the Askaris, who always went into battle with their families close at hand. Askari soldiers would often attack with babies strapped to their backs. Lettow-Vorbeck's forces had consisted of some 10 to 15 carriers and servants for every German officer. He cut this contingent back to less than six carriers per officer. His primary concern was food. Adequate rations were a constant problem. Although there were some desertions, for the most part the African Askaris were extremely loyal and effective. Fortunately for the Germans, early monsoon rains in late January 1917 prevented major British attacks. By May, frustrated with the inactivity of Brig. Gen. A. R. Hoskins, who had succeeded Gen. Smuts, the War Office replaced him with Gen. Louis Jacob Van Deventer, a tough and able soldier who had served under Smuts in the Boer War. Van Deventer could not speak English, and required an interpreter to communicate with his demoralized British forces. In the meantime, Lettow-Vorbeck was cut off from all communication with Germany. In fact he had been awarded Germany's highest military decoration, the Pour le Merite (Blue Max) in late 1916. He received news of it by way of a truce messenger dispatched by Gen. Smuts. In the fall of 1917 Lettow-Vorbeck was promoted to major general. In the coastal regions, he reinforced Capt. Looff with 600 men under Maj. Georg Kraut. Looff began attacking and tying down large numbers of British forces as far south as Lindi. In the meantime, the German commander began to consolidate his main force. He placed Gen. Kurt Wahle, whose western forces had arrived in the Lindi area, in charge of Capt. Looff's men. On October 15, 1917 the British, with 6,000 troops, decided to attack Gen. Wahle's force of 2,000 near Mahiwa. Lettow-Vorbeck reinforced Gen. Wahle with an additional 1,000 Askaris. The battle was a rout. The British suffered nearly 2,500 casualties, while the Germans sustained losses of 70 Germans and about 450 Askaris. By this time the Germans had run out of ammunition for the Königsberg guns, and had abandoned them. Very short on weapons and ammunition, they were delighted when they captured a field gun, nine machine guns and 300,000 rounds of ammunition. Von Lettow had to make a major decision. Even with the materiel captured at Mahiwa, he had but three weeks supply for his current force. Although his men had captured British and Portuguese rifles, half of his ammunition supply consisted of cartridges for the German-issue 1871 Mausers. In addition to awesome logistical problems, there was the continual sniping and fifth column activities of Governor Schnee, the news that great numbers of American troops were arriving in France, skillful British propaganda and a general feeling of demoralization among the colonial civilians. Given the facts of his situation, the general streamlined his force to 200 German officers, 1,700 Askaris and 3,000 carriers. The latter group would drop off as supplies were used up. He assigned the remainder of his troops to Capt. Looff, who was furious at being left behind. With another unit of 1,000 men under Capt. Tafel, who was fighting a rear guard action in the west, Lettow-Vorbeck crossed the Rovuma river. On November 24, 1917 he invaded Portuguese East Africa. Capt. Tafel arrived two days later. Not finding his commander, and with rumors of the Bush Ghost's demise, Tafel surrendered his detachment to the British. Fortunately, his men were virtually out of supplies and ammunition. At about this time, one of the great sidebar stories of World War I took place. In Germany, the Zeppelin L-59 had been loaded with 13 tons of supplies for the troops fighting in Africa. The airship left Bulgaria on November 21, 1917. Through storm, desert heat and many other difficulties the L-59 reached the Khartoum, Egypt area on November 23. After traversing 4,000 miles, the L-59's commander was ordered to turn back by German intelligence. British propaganda had convinced the Germans that Lettow-Vorbeck's force had been defeated and driven out of East Africa. In late 1917 and early 1918 Lettow-Vorbeck's troops defeated several Portuguese forces. They captured forts and supply dumps, thereby resupplying themselves to a considerable extent. The German-Askari soldiers had marched 15 to 20 miles a day for seven hour periods in order to execute their plans. Edwin Hoyt described the German marching column as follows in his book Guerrilla: The troop consisted of three columns. First came the attack unit, next the field hospital and finally the Askaris with a day's march between each column. Each column had a fighting company. The Askaris marched along smartly, standing up straight, rifles over shoulders, with butt out behind in the Schutztruppe tradition. They walked along singing and chattering. With them marched children and adolescents clothed in bits and scraps of Askari uniforms. In spite of all the noise, the Askaris were alert to the slightest noise or movement in the bush about them. In the first quarter of 1918, the troop marched steadily, covering 2,500 miles, penetrating deep into Mozambique. The Portuguese were overwhelmed and were sabotaged by natives, who were bitter at the treatment dispensed by these colonial masters. The Germans usually had the better of a number of small skirmishes, but were suffering from blackwater fever. The Askaris suffered from stomach cramps caused by insufficiently cooked manioc, which was used instead of corn and wheat. Many sick and wounded were left behind to the pursuing British, who to their credit, offered humane treatment. Without maps and in an unknown territory, the Germans stuck to deep bush and game trails. They ambushed their pursuers and set fire to elephant grass. By this time Lettow-Vorbeck was in wretched health. Six major British columns, each of which was significantly larger than the Schutztruppe, were in worse shape than the Germans. They lost an estimated 26,000 porters. The British supply bases in Mozambique no longer functioned. Near Namacurra, the Germans captured a river steamer with a load of medical supplies and quinine. Down river near a railhead was a major supply depot guarded by the British and Portuguese. Attacking with one of his columns, the Bush Ghost's men inflicted over 700 casualties. Many of these were suffered within the jaws of crocodiles, who feasted on the retreating forces attempting to cross the Namacurra river. The booty contained enough guns, ammunition and food to supply the Germans for many months ahead. Lettow-Vorbeck even allowed a 24 hour food and liquor orgy to celebrate the victory. In the spring of 1918, Gen. Van Deventer was congratulated by his superiors for driving the Germans out of East Africa. However, in an outstanding masterstroke, after leading over 17,000 pursuing British deep into Mozambique, Lettow-Vorbeck turned north once again. The British had landed thousands of additional forces at Amelia and Quelimane to cut off the Germans in the east and south. In July 1918, Lettow-Vorbeck's troops turned north between two large pursuing columns. They never detected bis presence. Having shed his carriers weeks before, Lettow-Vorbeck split his force into small, company strength units, which could easily vanish into the bush. Eventually, after a number of skirmishes, the British again located Lettow-Vorbeck, in August near the Rovuma river. Attrition worried the German commander, now terribly fatigued. But he marched on. His officer corps had suffered heavy casualties over time. By September, the Spanish influenza epidemic of that period finally made its way to Africa. The troops were subjected to its ravages. Governor Schnee demanded that the German commander surrender to the British. On September 18, 1918, the ragged German-Askari force crossed the Rovuma. The British panicked, and assumed that it would attack Tabora, the great central railroad depot. The British were everywhere. Lettow-Vorbeck stated that for every man of his command, the British had at least one staff officer stationed from Nairobi to Port Amelia. In October Lettow-Vorbeck marched along Lake Nyasa and took the supply depot at Kasama. Hearing that Rhodesia was wide open, he invaded that British colony. He crossed its border on November 13 (two days after the Armistice) with plans to take the major supply center at Fife. He had been tying down at least 160,000 British troops in East Africa. Then, to the total surprise of Gen. von Lettow-Vorbeck and his officers, a truce courier arrived with a telegram announcing the Armistice. It took some days to verify the authenticity of the first and other telegrams, which were finally made official by a cablegram from the British War Office. At this point, after fighting for over four years, the "Bush Ghost" surrendered to Gen. Van Deventer at Abercorn. The date was November 25, 1918. Marching to Abercorn, the Askaris sang "Heia Safari, Tuna-kwenda, tuna-shinda/We go, we win." The war was over. Thirty German officers, 125 settlers, five German doctors, 1,100 Askaris and 819 women laid down their 38 machine guns, an old naval cannon and 2,000 rifles. One of the most incredible, and incredibly unremembered, campaigns in the history of modern arms had come to an end. In World War I - An Illustrated History author Susanne Everett observed: "Lettow-Vorbeck eluded all of them, time after time, inflicting a local defeat on his pursuers and then slipping away to double back on them in the dense bush and appear on their flank or rear." Today in Dar es Salaam, in the center of this city of 1,500,000 people, there is a superb monument dedicated to the Askaris of Africa. It shows a native soldier in full German battle kit, attacking with rifle and bayonet. Underneath is an inscription in Swahili, Arabic and English drafted by Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck: "In memory of native African troops who fought - To the carriers who were the feet and hands of the army - And to all other men who served and died - In German East Africa 1914-1918 - Your sons will remember your name." On March 9, 1964, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck expired 11 days short of his 94th birthday. The New York Times obituary read: As commander of German-officered native troops in German East Africa in WWI, Colonel (later general) Lettow-Vorbeck was one of the most successful and tenacious guerrilla leaders in modern times. For more than four years his forces, never numbering more than 300 European officers and 11,000 natives, held about 300,000 British, South African, Portuguese and Belgian troops in check. His scrupulous observance of the rules of civilized warfare, such as freeing prisoners with their promise that they would not take up arms against him again, endeared him to friend and foe alike. In 1945, Field Marshal Jan Smuts, the great Boer leader, who was for a time Lettow-Vorbeck's greatest adversary, sought him out in post WWII Berlin. Reduced to starvation and poverty, and Gestapo house arrest, Smuts raised financial support from sympathetic South Africans. Lettow-Vorbeck was given food parcels and a lifetime pension from these sympathetic South Africans. What of post-colonial Tanzania today? In an October 29, 1995 story on the country's upcoming elections the New York Times saw it "mired in poverty, with a huge debt and a government strangled by bureaucracy and corruption . . . " Looking at the brighter side, the Times observed that "Although Tanzania is still miserably poor, poverty is much more visible in [its northem coastal neighbor] Kenya, where the disparity in wealth is far greater." So much for "throwing off the yoke of colonialism" in lands blessed with an abundance of natural riches, over which the British and German empires fought a punishing but little remembered war; so recently yet so very long ago.
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November 25, 1918; with receipt of evidence that an
armistice had indeed been signed by the Central Powers and
the Allies. 
cruisers of Admiral King-Hall's Cape Squadron shelled the
capital on August 7, 1914, destroying the main radio tower.
Dr. Schnee declared the city open, signed a truce with the
British and fled, leaving only a police captain in charge.
Hearing of this, Lettow-Vorbeck sent one of his officers,
Captain Theodor Tafel, to take charge of the city. The
British withdrew, and continued hunting the
Königsberg.