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GRUESOME HARVEST
The Costly Attempt To Exterminate The People of Germany

By Ralph Franklin Keeling

 
Chapter X:
FACTS WE MUST FACE

How We Played into Russia's Hands

General Eisenhower told a press conference in London that the Russians "like to laugh." Well they might, in view of the way we have played into their hands and fallen for their subterfuges.

Things have come to such a pass that we have seriously been told we must not criticize the Russians or their government; yet those who said so have felt perfectly free to criticize everything American and have made no corresponding effort to stop Soviet blasts at us.

In March, 1945, GI's in Germany were actually placed under oflicial orders not to make unflattering remarks about the Reds.[1] Typical of our un-American efforts to throttle critics was AMG censorship in April, 1946, of a letter by a Catholic Bishop calling attention to Russian abuses of Germans through forced labor and expulsions. We prohibited the reading of the letter in churches, because it might offend Russia.[2] Social Democrats and other German political parties have not been allowed to criticize the Communist party, lest Russia take offense.

We must realize that there is something seriously wrong with nations, as with people, who cannot stand criticism, who try to place themselves beyond reproach, and that something is equally wrong with people who truckle to them.

Russia deserves not only criticism but condemnation. Stalin in 1939 told the Communist Party of Russia it must beware of us, for we would send our "spies, murderers, and wreckers" into the Soviet Union. The facts are that the Soviet Union has sent its spies, murderers, and wreckers into this country, as in all others, where they have infiltrated into our government, occupying hundreds of key positions, sitting in our inner councils, and even helping mold our foreign policy.

It must make the Russians chortle up their sleeves the way we coddle these insidious fifth columnists. In contrast, the Reds shoot on suspicion anyone they catch in Russia who they think might represent outside influences.

In the Canadian spy trial it was established both by direct testimony and documentary proof that "the dissolution of the Communist International was probably the greatest farce of the Communists in recent years," and that "only the name was liquidated with the object of reassuring public opinion in the democratic countries. Actually, the Comintern exists and continues its work." Communist insiders were warned by their higher-ups with regard to Britain and the United States: "Yesterday they were allies, today they are neighbors, tomorrow they will be our enemies." It was also brought out that "in Russia there is a great deal of propaganda carried on by conversation of the propagandists and even in the press. It is all done to train people to think they must fight another war, that maybe it will be our final war."[3]

In Germany we have permitted the Comintern to place its agents in AMG and the local German government apparatus we have erected. Newspapermen in our zone tend to lean toward communism, mostly because former anti-Nazi talent was first cleared for press work by German emigres with leftist leanings hired by AMG to do the screening.[4]

In May, 1946, it was revealed that the State Department with the aid of the FBI had purged itself of hundreds of pro-Soviet employees.[5] Some time later Mr. Byrnes, head of the department, when asked why certain others had not been let out, despite their having been identified, replied that it would be inadvisable to do so while we are involved in a serious diplomatic struggle with the Soviet Union.[6]

His excuse was a tacit admission that he recognized that the men are agents of the Soviet Government, and that the Kremlin might get upset if we turned the rotters out.

There is no valid reason why we should treat Russia and her fifth column any differently from the way we treated Nazi Germany and its fifth column. The only important difference between the two in terms of their threat against our national tranquility and safety is that the Soviet fifth column is far stronger and more deeply entrenched than the Nazi one ever was. If it was right for us to crack down on the Nazis here the way we did, without regard to Hitler's feelings, it is right that we should crack down with equal firmness and effectiveness on the Communists in our midst, without regard to Stalin's feelings, for all of them would be potential traitors and saboteurs if we should get into serious trouble with Russia.

One of the most costly consequences of Soviet penetration of our State Department has been our acceptance of wily Russian proposals at Yalta and Potsdam. These include: division of Germany into zones, each to be occupied by a different power; the Allied Control Council, with the clause calling for unanimity on all decisions, with the disastrous results already noted; requiring Germany to pay reparations in kind; the forced labor system; the forcible expulsions of Germans from lost German territories, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. The territorial settlements and arrangements accepted at Potsdam were all the ones pressed by Russia; French claims were left open. The idea of a long armistice for Germany, if not of actual Russian origin, would certainly play into Russia's hands.[7]

Britain and the United States in the days between Teheran and Potsdam, thanks in large measure to Mr. Roosevelt's unfortunate "great design" and Red influences in the administration, were eager to borrow any Soviet idea and acclaim any Soviet plan for Germany. Although deeply involved in war, the brains of the Politburo found the time to frame a program to take full advantage of the westerners' solicitude. They have been cashing in on it ever since, and we have been suffering the consequences.

We have even given Russia help both direct and indirect in extending her power over eastern Europe and half of Germany. Instead of following Churchill's advice of attacking Germany through the Balkans and thus warding off Russian conquest and occupation, we sided with Russia and decided to attack across the English Channel. As the Russians swept into the Balkans and on into Austria and Germany, they rode in American lend-lease trucks, jeeps and airplanes. Since then we have supported their brutal rule through such agencies as UNRRA. As fast as we have shipped relief supplies into these areas, Russia has drained out an equivalent amount for herself and claims the credit for what we pour in.[8] In Germany we even handed the Russians our money plates and permitted them to print billions of occupation marks which we were originally supposed to make good, and possibly still are. But all such aid, including the eleven billion dollars in lendlease gifts has been ignored by the Kremlin which has gone blithely on its way opposing our most vital interests.


We Should Have Known Better

In addition to all this, as Dorothy Thompson has well expressed it: "Mr. Morgenthau's fantastic concepts laid the basic 'principles' for the Potsdam program, which played straight into Soviet hands."[9] In other words, the Morgenthau Plan was made to order for the Kremlin.

When we came to Russia at Yalta with a so-called peace plan which called for vengeance and destruction of a trade competitor, she saw and seized her opportunity to turn the whole program to her advantage at our expense.

Although the Plan promises to bring the blessings of peace and prosperity to a troubled world, if we had only taken the trouble to analyze its proposals in the light of Mr. Morgenthau's own principles as expressed in other connections on other occasions, we should have recognized immediately that it could only bring catastrophe.

In promoting acceptance of the Bretton Woods Fund and Bank Plan, Mr. Morgenthau as Secretary of the Treasury, proclaimed the thesis that "prosperity, like peace, is indivisible." And in promoting the loan to Britain later on he elaborated at length on this principle. These are his words:

"If we have learned nothing else from the frightful experience of war, we should have learned at least that we live in an incorribly integrated world. It is a world which cannot exist half slave and half free, nor half at war and half at peace. Neither can it exist half prosperous and half impoverished. Prosperity, like peace is indivisible. It must be shared by all if any are to enjoy it." - "Our own living standards cannot rise and remain at high levels without progressive prosperity throughout the world." - "As I have observed before, prosperity cannot be segmented; all must share in it or in time all will lose it."[10] (emphasis added)

The contradiction between these tenets and the deliberate impoverishment of any nation is irreconcilable and obvious. Mr. Morgenthau advances these ideas as universal principles, applicable to all countries without exception. If they could validly be used to support making sacrifices to put one country, Britain, on its feet to bolster world trade and prosperity, with equal force they compel the conclusion that a program calling for permanent impoverishment of any leading country, Germany not excepted, would plunge the whole world into an economic quagmire.

Mr. Morgenthau is not alone, however, in thus compromising himself with his own principles. Mr. Bernard Baruch, well known adviser of Presidents, has also been at one and the same time a one-worlder and an implacable advocate of converting Germany into a poor house. As the war was drawing to its close in the European theater, Mr. Baruch, who loves to address his audiences as "Fellow citizens of the world," was in London where he granted an interview to a Victor Lasky, a Stars and Stripes staff writer. In explaining his presence in the British capital, Baruch said, according to Lasky:

"And one reason I am over here is to hold a big stick over the big boys to make damn sure they're not going to foul up the peace. We've got to de-industrialize Germany and Japan - for at least a generation - to see that those subsidized slave labor countries do not again flood the world with their cheap products . . ."[11]

This was Mr. Baruch's way of saying that he was abroad to see to it that Germany was permanently eliminated as a competitor in world trade.

Baruch failed to explain the nature of the "big stick" he was holding over the big boys, but the following June, before the Senate Military Affairs Committee, he made very clear what he wanted done with the Reich. He said it was not enough merely to demand an "economically weak" Germany, that the program of weakening Germany must be "sufficiently specific - industry by industry - so that all the occupying nations know they have agreed to the same thing." First of all, he said, reparations should be paid in German labor, instead of rebuilding the country's industry so it could pay reparations through exports from current production. Germany's "war making potential must be eliminated. Many of her plants must be shifted east and west to friendly countries; all heavy industries destroyed; the Junker estates broken up; her exports strictly controlled; German assets and business organizations all over the world rooted out."

This program of impoverishment and that of Mr. Morgenthau are, of course, very similar. Mr. Baruch candidly admits that his aim is to destroy Germany as a trade competitor; Mr. Morgenthau's program tacitly contains the same objective. People were appalled when it was said that the elder Rockefeller burned down the refineries of competitors he could not otherwise destroy. How much more revolting are these proposals to destroy the economy of a whole nation for a similar purpose! Conservative leaders who use their influence in this manner furnish a basis for effective criticism of capitalistic morality, or lack of it, and weaken the basis for defense of the profit system. Since, according to the one world thesis, prosperity "must be shared by all if any are to enjoy it," and "all must share in it or in time all will lose it," the Morgenthau-Baruch Plan would impoverish not only Germany, but Europe, and the whole world, not excluding the United States, and therefore presumably Messrs. Baruch and Morgenthau as well.

The Morgenthau-Baruch proposals have been the official policy of our Government, which at the same time is committed to one-world principles. As a result, our leading officials, in their efforts to uphold these mutually exclusive theories, have been forced, like Mr. Morgenthau, into absurd self-contradiction. For example, Mr. Truman, while advocating impoverishment of Germany along Morgenthau-Baruch lines, said at Soldiers Field in Chicago:

"We shall work to achieve equal opportunity in world trade because closed economic blocs in Europe or any place in the world can only lead to impoverishment and isolation of the people who inhabit it. We shall press for the elimination of artificial barriers to international navigation, in order that no nation, by accident of geographic location, shall be denied unrestricted access to seaports and international waterways."

Later he said in the same speech:

"Economic distress, anywhere in the world, is a fertile breeding ground for violent political upheaval."[12]

By continuing our policy of creating economic distress in Germany, we would therefore create a fertile breeding ground for communism. Here Mr. Truman admits as much.

In his speech in Stuttgart, Mr. Byrnes contradicted himself in similar fashion, for he tried to justify the original program of deindustrialization and denazification, which means holding Germany in poverty, and at the same time said:

"We have learned, whether we like it or not, that we live in one world from which we cannot isolate ourselves. We have learned that peace and well-being are indivisible."

Before we can win the respect of the world and get on the right road leading to real world prosperity and well-being, we must eradicate the whole Morgenthau and Potsdam contamination from our thinking and official policies.


Germany, the Heart of Europe

We must take seriously the recognized fact that Germany is the heart of Europe on which the economic life of that Continent depends, and that when we make that heart stop beating all Europe must die. We must realize, too, that any reduction of the German standard of living would only lower the standards of other European countries, that to bring them all to the same mean level would bring universal impoverishment that would cancel out the progress of centuries.

Despite his one-world principles expressed elsewhere, Mr. Morgenthau in his book, GERMANY IS OUR PROBLEM, writes:

"Actually there is no 'European Economy,' certainly not in the sense that there is a United States economy. Some thirty countries in Europe have their separate economies, and a great variety of them, too." (p. 31)

He factiously argues that "a strong Europe is better than a strong Germany," as though the two were opposed, and insists that weakening Germany and reducing her foreign trade will add to European prosperity. He says:

"Before World War I, Germany accounted for 12 per cent of the world's international commerce. By the 1920's her share had fallen below 10 per cent. In 1936 and 1937 it was a bit more than 8 per cent. The world would not be the loser if Germany fell to 2 or 3 per cent and her share were taken over by other nations." (pp. 71-2)

In short, where Germany is concerned, Mr. Morgenthau finds foreign trade quite unimportant either for the Reich or for the countries trading with her; however, when other countries are involved, foreign trade takes on unique importance.

In a statement submitted to the Small Business Committee of the Senate, April 20, 1945, Mr. Morgenthau said:

"Our exports may seem to be only a small part of our total production. They are, nevertheless, vital. . . . They mean the difference between prosperity and depression for both agriculture and industry."

On Feb. 26, 1945, he told the Detroit Economic Club, while urging building up our exports of automobiles to a million cars a year:

"We can reach such a trade level only if both the producing and consuming powers of all countries are expanded, not merely restored to their old levels."

Such statements show that Mr. Morgenthau himself, if he will only think things through, must repudiate his proposals to impoverish the Reich and destroy its trade with the rest of the world, or give up one-world principles.

Britain's experience testifies eloquently to the importance of Germany to European economy. At first she fell under the influence of those advocating German impoverishment, ostensibly to prevent another war but actually to remove the Reich as a trade competitor and possibly turn it into a market for the very products it had formerly exported. But when she saw that Germany was facing complete disaster, and pulling Europe down with her, she partly reversed her position, to prevent what "approximated closely to cutting off one's nose to spite one's face." For, after all, she had to realize that destruction of Germany to prevent German exports from competing with hers would also mean loss of a large German demand for British goods. As Prime Minister Attlee told the U. S. Congress, "We cannot have prosperity at home with hell abroad."

The German prostration has been felt everywhere. Sweden has officially expressed concern over the fact that she has been unable to carry on any of her accustomed trade with the Reich, with damaging consequences to herself as well as to Germany.[13] Holland, too, has been hard hit, having to export food and fuel while the homeland does without. Dutch farmers used to exchange food products for German fertilizer, which they can obtain now only at high prices from high cost producers. Holland used to get fees for transmitting goods between Germany and other countries; now this trade and its profit are gone with the suppression of German commerce. Germany and Holland used to exchange the things each made best in its own country. This put German machinery, tools, and instruments in Dutch plants, on Dutch farms and railroads. Now this equipment cannot be replaced or even repaired due to stoppage of manufacture in the Reich. As one observer puts it:

"The deindustrialization decrees have been encouraged by less efficient interests of the United Nations, especially England, which hope to gain by the death sentences for German competition. The Netherlands and other countries are missing what they used to get from Germany."[14]

In London, "Food ministers of 17 European countries," says an Associated Press dispatch, "turned to defeated Germany as a possible source of coal and fertilizer, both sorely needed to avoid famine."[15]

Showing deep concern, The London Economist says:

"The truth is that the prosperity of Western Europe has depended to a great extent upon the existence of a great wealth producing industrial concentration in the Ruhr. That wealth-producing machinery is now almost completely idle, and all of Germany's western neighbors are bearing the consequences.
"To say that the ruin of Germany is the ruin of Europe would not raise in Russia more than a sigh of relief that both should be weakened together. The American attitude is more difficult to understand."
[16]

The Chicago Sun said editorially:

"It is good business - plain, hardboiled common sense - for any wholesaler to help his best customer back on his feet when that customer is in financial difficulty. If the customer is a whole nation, the need becomes immensely more pressing."[17]

Of course this was said in defense of a loan to Britain, but the same logic would apply as well to Germany, once one of our best customers.

Mr. Byrnes said at Paris:

"The economic revival of Germany is essential to the well-being of Europe."

At Stuttgart he admitted, as had Molotov at Paris, that Germany is the industrial workshop of Europe.

To repeat, we are having to face the fact that we cannot continue with our original policies toward Germany and hope to have anything but impoverishment of Germany, and, as a consequence, of Europe, and the world.


The Matter of War Guilt

Mr. Morgenthau, whose ideas on the subject correspond to the official opinion of the United Nations, rests his entire case for turning Germany into a poorhouse on the thesis that German lust for war was the sole cause of both World Wars. "Desire for war," he writes in bis book, "has been as firmly planned in the German as desire for freedom in the American." Sheer will to war, accompanied by a plot to conquer the world, he says, has been intensively cultivated in the German people for nearly two hundred years and would probably require another two hundred years to eradicate. Hence, he argues, the only way to stop Germany from again disturbing the peace of the world at her first opportunity is to prevent the opportunity, and this can be done best by permanently weakening her to a point where she cannot, even though she would, wage war.[18]

The justice of his whole program, and therefore of Potsdam, must stand or fall on this premise. If there is any doubt as to its validity or completeness, there must be equal doubt as to the justice of his plan.

Without attempting to exhaust the subject we offer the following evidence which does tend to raise doubt concerning the accuracy of the premise, and therefore equal doubt as to the justice of our treatment of the German people.

Let us again consult Mr. Morgenthau on other occasions. On March 7, 1945, he told the House Committee on Banking and Currency:

"Power politics . . . has become a term of reproach in the world. . . . The United Nations hope to abolish it from the earth. But power economics may be just as dangerous, for if it is not the root of all evil in international affairs it is at the very least a frequent cause of conflict. The legislation before this committee is our best hope of banishing that too.
"We cannot say that we will join the other nations in an organization to maintain peace, but will not help remove one of the most dangerous causes of war - economic dislocation."
[19]

Economic dislocation is hardly the same thing as the perversity of German nature or "will to war."

Three months later, Mr. Morgenthau told the Senate Banking and Currency Committee:

"Peace is more than a political problem. It is a complicated structure than can be built only upon the solid foundation of economic order and prosperity in all countries. Peace and prosperity are two sides of the same problem. We can 't neglect one without endangering the other. If peace is to endure, there must be jobs, there must be hope of economic betterment.
"International monetary and financial problems have been a source of conflict for a generation.
We must see that after this war they do not become the basis for new conflicts."
[20]

Lack of prosperity and hope of economic betterment and international monetary and financial problems were therefore at least partly to blame for the recent war, according to Mr. Morgenthau himself, not merely German lust for war, argued in his book.

He told the St. Louis Chamber of Commerce:

"After the last war, informal attempts were made to stabilize currencies but they failed. . . . Competitive currency depreciation led to other forms of economic warfare. . . . New currency tricks restricted and burdened trade. They must certainly be counted as a contributory cause of the great depression. And they were the first phase of the tragic war in which we are now engaged."[21]

Mr. Vinson, successor to Mr. Morgenthau as Secretary of the Treasury, gave his version of the causes of war in these words:

"We have the political, social, and economic problems among nations that twice in our generation rocked us into war. The resolution of these problems is necessary for prolonged prosperity and for lasting peace."[22]

Solving such problems to prevent war is a far cry from our original policy of trying to maintain peace by turning Germany into a goat pasture.

Herbert E. Gasten, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in a published speech said:

"It was almost entirely because of the sick condition of foreign trade that we were barely getting out of the last depression when war came upon us."[23]

And on another occasion he said:

"It seemed apparent even before the present war began with Germany's assault on Poland that we could not have political peace without economic peace and thriving world trade were not possible except under conditions of monetary peace."[24]

That most wars, including the last one, have been caused by economic disruption and consequent "foul growths," to borrow a phrase from the late Lord Keynes, is a truism which no informed person will deny. Such dislocations and their results are not the same as human beings; human beings are the victims. Therefore, it is wrong to blame people for the forces which compel their behavior. When people fall into a trap where their very existence is threatened, they will fight their way out if there is any possibility to do so. They will fight, even though it might appear suicidal to do so. For most people prefer to die fighting than to die supinely. Such behavior may be wrong, but it is the way people have behaved for many thousands of years, and the chances are they will continue to do so.

The British themselves have often found conditions during peace more unbearable than war. Whenever the balance of power is upset in Europe so that the continent starts to fall under the domination of some one of its powers, Britain considers the situation a threat to her very existence and goes to war to preserve herself. One of the best and most authoritative analyses of the matter appeared in the September, 1943, issue of the semi-official British publication, "The Nineteenth Century and After," by the editor, Mr. F. A. Voight. The following are pertinent excerpts:

"It is fashionable to dismiss the balance of power as an obsolete doctrine. It is not a doctrine. It is, for Great Britain and the Empire the immutable condition of survival. Any power that becomes undisputed master of the European mainland can become master of the British Isles. . . .
"England has no one permanent foe in Europe, and none of her vital interests conflict with the vital interests of any European power. Her only foe is that power, or that coalition of powers, which may endeavor to dominate Europe. Against that foe she must always be ready, always be strong, and always have allies. As her foe varies, so her allies must vary. The foe of yesterday may be the ally of tomorrow and the ally of yesterday may be the foe of tomorrow.
"The power of the British Empire, plus the power of continental allies, will, if the Empire is strong, always balance the power of whatever power seeks domination. And as long as the balance is maintained, there will be peace, for no one power can prevail over the rest of Europe plus the British Empire, as long as the Empire is strong.
"This simple mechanism is the balance of power. It exists by virtue of the immutable physical realities. Neither the League of Nations, nor any system of collective security, nor disarmament can change these realities. As soon as the balance of power is challenged, every collective system will collapse and England will, if she is not to perish, make the counter-challenge. She did so in 1939. The mechanism of the balance was released and the League of Nations was at once deprived of whatever reality it had ever possessed on the 1st of September in that year, on the day when Germany attacked Poland and, so releasing the mechanism, began the second world war. England fought to preserve the balance - for that reason and no other.
"The commonly accepted view that Germany made war to dominate the world is, in our opinion, mistaken.
"She wanted to be a world power, but world power and world domination are not the same thing (England is a world power, but she does not dominate the world). Hitler would have been glad to share the world with the English. . . . Had England remained neutral he would have been successful. But she would then have been at his mercy, or the mercy of his successor - in any case at the mercy of the German Nation. . . . Nothing could have saved England from destruction - except the good will of the Germans....
"It was to avert this fate that England went to war in 1939. It is to avert a similar fate in future years that the balance must always be maintained. The political complexion of those that maintain the balance is quite irrelevant. . . . The nature of the peace must be determined by the enduring realities of the European situation, not by transient phenomena like fascism, national socialism, socialism, or communism. This exorbitant strength of Germany must be reduced and it must be kept reduced. Better a despotically governed Germany that is not too strong than a liberal Germany that is too strong. . . . But it is . . . important that the weakening of Germany be relative rather than absolute."
[25]

This explains in terms very different from Mr. Morgenthau's the underlying cause of the two world wars. It explains Britain' s interest in the Potsdam agreements, including de-industrialization and de-nazification, and the exigencies behind Britain's present opposition to Russia, which again threatens to upset the European balance, just as Germany did. It disputes the thesis that the German people and their perversities were solely responsible for the war and should be punished accordingly.

It also clarifies a good many otherwise unexplainable episodes connected with the war and its outbreak. It shows why Britain went to war ostensibly to oppose aggression, but applied the policy only to Germany, and not to Russia when she attacked Poland in full partnership with Germany. It explains the reason for the secret protocol attached to her declaration guaranteeing British and French aid to Poland, which qualified and limited the guarantee to German aggression and none other. The portion of this treaty that was made public at the time, gave the impression that the guarantee stood on moral ground, against any and all aggression. The published part stated:

"Should one of the contracting powers become engaged in hostilities with a European power in consequence of aggression by the latter against that contracting party, the other contracting party will at once give the contracting power engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power."

Although the language is somewhat involved, the meaning is clear, that defense against aggression was the prime consideration and what England would fight for. The German attack against Poland was considered a high international wrong. But when Russia also attacked and Britain failed to oppose this aggression which was also a brutal stab in the back, but continued the war against Germany alone, it became clear to many observers that something more was present in the situation than readily met the eye. There was a secret rider attached to the treaty which has since been made public and which stipulates that "The expression, a European power, employed in the agreement is to be understood as Germany."[26]

In other words, Britain was taking advantage of the situation to go to war against Germany because the Reich had become too strong and had upset the European balance. To correct the fundamental trouble, from Britain's point of view, Germany, after her defeat, must be weakened as a protective measure. No morality enters into the matter, only considerations of power politics and British survival.

Lord Lothian, ihen British ambassador to the United States, said in March, 1938, at the time of the Austrian crisis:

"If another war comes and the history of it is ever written, the dispassionate historian a hundred years hence, will say not that Germany alone was responsible for it, even if she strikes first, but that those who mismanaged the world between 1918 and 1917 had a large share of responsibility in it."[27]

In his column, April 23, 1944, Karl Von Wiegand wrote:

"On April, 1939, four months before Hitler invaded Poland, Ambassador William C. Bullitt, whom I had known for 20 years, called me to the American embassy in Paris. Both of us standing before the fireplace in his office, the windows of which faced the beautiful Place de la Concorde, the American Ambassador told me that war had been decided upon. He did not say, nor did I ask, by whom. He let me infer it. When I said that in the end Germany would be driven into the arms of Soviet Russia and Bolshevism, the ambassador replied: 'What of it. There will not be enough Germans left when the war is over to be worth bolshevizing.'"[28]

A month earlier, according to the Associated Press:

"Joseph Stalin, in one of his most outspoken statements, told the world that Soviet Russia would not be dragged into conflict with Germany as a 'cat's paw' to pull British and French chestnuts out of the fire. . . . Underlying the policy of nonintervention (against fascism) he said was a desire to embroil ltaly, Japan, and Germany as deeply as possible in war against the Soviet Union and then, when they all had become weakened by conflict, 'come on the stage with fresh forces and dictate peace."[29]

And a month after the conflict started Pravda said:

"Peace and friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Germany are also in the interests of all nations of Europe. Conditions of anxiety, enmity and mutual distrust in Eastern Europe are advantageous only for warmongers who are used to make others pull chestnuts out of the fire for them. Such conditions were maintained in the course of many years by a policy of incitement of one country against the other."[30]

Professor Harry Elmer Barnes in reply to the charge of bellicosity of the German people says:

"England has been way out in front in point of relative bellicosity among the nations, while Germany and the Netherlands stand at the very bottom of the list, next to Denmark."

This conclusion is forced by such findings as those in Professor Quincy Wright's "A Study of War" wherein it is shown that in the period from 1480 to 1940 there were 278 wars involving European countries, whose percentage participation was as follows:

"England, 28; France, 26; Spain, 23; Russia, 22; Austria, 19; Turkey, 15; Poland, 11; Sweden, 9; Italy, 9; Netherlands, 8; Germany (including Prussia), 8; and Denmark, 7," (Vol. I, p. 221)

Likewise Pitirim Sorokin, in Vol. III, Part II of his SOCIAL AND CULTURAL DYNAMICS, shows that from the twelfth century to 1925 the percentage of years in which leading European powers have been at war is as follows (p. 352):

Country.........Percent of Years at War
Spain ............................67
Poland ..........................58
England .........................56
France ...........................50
Russia ...........................46
Holland .........................44
Italy ...............................36
Germany ........................28

Sorokin concludes, therefore, "that Germany has had the smallest and Spain the largest per cent of years at war." Of leading modern European states England, France, and Russia thus show nearly twice the bellicosity displayed by the "war-loving" Germans.

Prof. Barnes goes on:

"President Truman has well said that constructive public acts must be based on truth. It is too bad somebody could not have whispered a little truth into his ear before he left for Potsdam. There is little prospect that a structure erected wholly on lies in 1945 will endure any better than the one that was wholly based on lies in 1919.
"And the probability is that the disillusionment after Potsdam will set in much more rapidly than it did after Versailles. In the period after 1919, we had to wait some years to obtain formerly secret documents to upset the lies of the period of war and peacemaking. This time, the upsetting facts are already available and so clear that any honest and informed man can read them while running. The only thing that we have to wait for is courage enough to state what is today well known and above serious doubt - in short, to know that an honest historian will not be listed immediately as a defendant in a mass sedition trial.
[31]

Incitement to war is a terrible thing. Oliver Lyttleton, British Minister of Production, told the Chamber of Commerce of America in London, June 20, 1944, as reported by the United Press:

"Japan was provoked into attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty on history ever to say that America was forced into the war."[32]

It is now established that to avoid war with the United States, Germany ordered its submarines not to retaliate in any way when attacked by U.S. forces under orders from Washington. In clear violation of international law our vessels in the Atlantic were ordered two months before Pearl Harbor to shell all Axis craft encountered. At the time, Admiral Stark had sent a message to Admiral Kimmel that "we are at war" in the Atlantic.

Two months after Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons:

"When I survey and compute the powers of the United States and its vast resources and feel that they are now in it with us, with British Commonwealth of Nations all together, however long it lasts, till death or victory, I cannot believe that there is any other fact in the whole world which can compare with that. That is what I had dreamed of, aimed at, and worked for, and now it has come to pass."[33]

Our lend-lease program had been squeezed through Congress by the narrowest of margins as a "peace measure." Senator Glass had given away its real purpose, however, when he said he favored loaning Great Britain all the war equipment we could spare "to wipe Germany off the face of the map.[34] He had the courage to say what was on the mind of many a figure in Washington and elswhere.

Hitler has been condemned as a violator of international pacts and agreements; yet when we sent destroyers to Britain long before Pearl Harbor and later on permitted many of our vessels to be commandeered by British officers we violated Section 3 of Article V of the Act of June 15, 1917, which provides that during a war in which the United States is a neutral nation, it shall be unlawful to send out of the jurisdiction of the United States any vessel built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war with any intent or with reasonable cause to believe that it shall be used by any belligerent nation. We also violated the Hague Convention which forbids a neutral nation to supply any war materials whatever to any belligerent country.

There is no need to pursue the argument further. We have shown that good grounds exist for doubting in some degree, at least, the charge that the German people, because of their perverse natures, and their will and lust for war, were the sole culprits in the late conflict. There is equal room, therefore, for doubting the Justice of the Potsdam program to cripple Germany and condemn its people to perpetual poverty, and equally sound moral grounds for the repudiation of that program.


On "Collective Guilt" and Propaganda

The victors in every war think they are right and the defeated wrong. The late war has offered no exception. By continuing to condemn the defeated in this war as a race of criminals and punishing them accordingly, as we at first set out to do, we would be setting a most dangerous precedent, one which our children might have good reason to regret. For if we should ever lose a war we could only expect similar treatment.

It is manifestly unjust to blame and punish the people of any country for the acts of their leaders, especially where the people have been brought under the heel of a dictatorship which under heavy penalty compels conformity to the leaders edicts and orders.

The truth is that the people of no nation in modern history, including ourselves, have ever enjoyed an important voice in the making of the great decisions either of going to war or of framing the peace arrangements. This is one of the greatest facts we must face. America cannot possibly add amelioration to the sordid game of power politics which has plunged the nations of the world into one terrible war after another, until the people do assert themselves and insist upon the injection of justice into the peace arrangements.

But before this can be accomplished they must break the bonds of false propaganda. This propaganda flows from two major levels, a higher and a lower. Britain's pose as upholder of righteousness while actually engaged in manipulating the balance of power system exemplifies the upper level. This type of propaganda is poignantly described by the late John Maynard Keynes in THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE:

"The politics of power are inevitable and there is nothing very new to learn about this war or the end it was fought for; England had destroyed, as in each preceding century, a trade rival; a mighty chapter had been closed in the secular struggle between the glories of Germany and of France. Prudence required some measure of lip service to the 'ideals' of foolish Americans and hypocritical Englishmen, but it would be stupid to believe that there is much room in the world, as it really is, for such affairs as the League of Nations or any sense in the principle of self-determination, except as an ingenious formula for rearranging the balance of power in one's own interests."

This was written about World War I, but it applies as well to the second. Another Englishman, the great Disraeli, said:

"All great events have been distorted, most of the important causes concealed, some of the principal characters never appear, and all who figure are so misunderstood and misrepresented that the result is a complete mystification. If the history of England is ever written by one who has the knowledge and the courage, the world would be astonished."[35]

British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin told the truth about the propaganda of the lower level when he said at the London Conference of Foreign Ministers, February 10, 1946:

"A newspaper has three things to do. One is to amuse, another is to entertain, and the rest is to mislead."[36]

That such propaganda has played an enormous part in fomenting most wars cannot be doubted. It deceives and bewilders the public, inflaming it and strengthening its innate prejudices which civilizing processes ordinanarily hold to tolerable proportions. People can accurately judge only those things which come within the purview of their direct experience or which they are allowed to view from all angles by educational processes. When the mediums upon which the people rely to bring them their foreign news, color and emasculate the facts, or even manufacture them out of whole cloth, as they sometimes do, there is no possibility for the public to get the truth. Its collective judgment, the accuracy of which is the base upon which democratic processes rest, cannot, in consequence, be reliable; on the contrary, if its judgment is misled and its passions inflamed properly for the purpose, it will inevitably support mad adventures, unjust interventions, and other tragic missteps in international affairs.

Thus, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, a month before war broke out, sadly observed:

"Unhappily, bad feeling between nations is fomented daily by poisonous propaganda in the press and by other means. I cannot help feeling that if only we halt this war of words and some action is taken which would tend to restore confidence of the people in the peaceful intentions of all the statesmen of Europe - if only that could be done, then I still feel that I know of no question that could not and should not be solved by peaceful discussions. The gain would be enormous. On the other hand, if war should come, whichever side may claim ultimate victory, nothing is more certain that victor and vanquished alike would glean a gruesome harvest of human misery and suffering."[37]

Americans, as well as the British, were flooded with misleading, inflamatory propaganda on the eve of the war. Only a few calm, informed observers were able, apparently, to see through it. In a letter to Hugh W. Long & Co., an executive of Roosevelt & Son of Pine Street, wrote six months before we were plunged into war:

"I cannot refrain from expressing my contempt for those who are politically toying with the fear motif at this time and painting a picture of the United States overrun by Adolph Hitler. There never was a country so strongly situated strategically for defense as this one, and when, in addition, that country has more oil than any other country in the world and more practical inventive achievements to its credit (inclucling the original invention of and most of the significant improvements upon the airplane), and has an established and recognized aptitude for mass production, it is clear to me that it has a special genius for mechanized warfare and that all talk about what Adolph Hitler's armed forces may do to us is just bunk.
"No. If totalitarianism is coming to the United States it will come because the American people can be charmed by insincere, superficial, adroit politicians and fail to demand the leadership of men of character, of courage, of honesty."
[38]

Perhaps the most poisonous of all the propaganda themes circulated in this country in full page newspaper ads and elsewhere was the purported statement of Adolph Hitler that he was going to come over here some day and finish off "decadent Yankeedom." The passage was dressed up to look like a direct quotation and was placed over the name of Adolph Hitler. Every effort was made to give the impression that it came from Mein Kampf; whereas, it was something Herman Rauschnigg had said Hitler had said - the unsupported testimony of one man, a refugee.

Such a proposition is quite at variance with what Hitler actually wrote in Mein Kampf where he decries Germany's vulnerability on account of her exposed borders and the small extent of her national territory and extolls the United States on account of "its vast space, which is equivalent to the site of a Continent" and its "incomparable inner strength.". . . "The gigantic North American State," he says, "with the enormous resources of its soil, is much more invulnerable than the encircled German Reich." Again he says:

"Military decisions are more quickly, more easily, more completely and more effectively gained against States which have extensive territories. Moreover, the magnitude of a national territory is of itself a certain assurance that an outside power will not hastily risk the adventure of an invasion; for in that case the struggle for power would have to be long and exhausting before victory could be hoped for. The risk being so great, there would have to be extraordinary reasons for such an aggressive adventure. Hence it is that the territorial magnitude of a State furnishes a basis whereon national liberty and independence can be maintained with relative ease . . ."[39]

Yet, how firmly propaganda had fixed the public impression that Mein Kampf offered a program for world conquest is brought out in the following excerpt taken from the transcript of the question period following an address given by Ambassador John Cudahy before the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations a month and a half before Pearl Harbor.

"Chairman Bentley: I have a question here in writing: 'How do you reconcile Hitler's announced plan of world conquest with his statements made to you?'
"Mr. Cudahy: I know of no plan of world conquest. (Cries of 'How about Mein Kampf?' from audience).
"I read Mein Kampf very thoroughly and I cannot find any plan of world conquest. (Cries of Oh-h-h-h from audience). It used to put me to sleep; but after I had been in Germany I read the thing very thoroughly. Hitler has made a number of statements that would indicate that he has dreamed of world empire, but I guess Hitler can be guilty of a bit of campaign oratory.
"I know that this war was caused by the last war."

There never was any actual evidence that world conquest was contemplated. General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, in his biennial report released in October, 1945, stated that valuation by the War Department General Staff of interrogations of ranking members of the German high command had "failed to disclose any over-all German strategic plan to conquer the world."[40]


Conclusion

The Allied program to reeducate the Germans is a case of one deluded group trying to disillusion another. Our conviction that the Germans have been filled with poisonous propaganda is quite correct and our impulse to extirpate the effects of that propaganda is a good one. However, we cannot accomplish our purpose when so many of our own ideas are false, and especially when the Germans know from direct experience that they are false. To be successful, a teacher must enjoy the respect of those he attempts to teach. He must win that respect through the demonstrated superiority of his knowledge and understanding. Part of what we are trying to teach the Germans is true and could have a most salutary effect on the German outlook, if only we could get the Germans to listen with respect and sympathy. But too much of what we try to make them believe the Germans know to be untrue, and this knowledge on their part causes them to lose their respect for us and to turn a deaf ear to everything we say.

Our reeducation program should begin at home. If we could only overcome the effects of our own illusions born of propaganda and ignorance arising from lack of intimate knowledge of European affairs, if we could only possess ourselves of the facts and then face them courageously, we not only could reeducate the Germans but could eliminate many erroneous and tragically dangerous features of our German program. Unless we do revise our own ideas and the program to which those ideas have given birth, we are in danger of losing Germany, Europe, and everything for which we fought this costly war. It is hoped that this book will help point the way to truth and therefore to our future success.

Our experience in Europe has already taught us some bitter lessons and has forced us to ameliorate in some degree the harsh and brutal program which we set about to force upon our defeated enemy. But we have much more to learn and must make many more changes in our policy before we can hope for the success of our German adventure. With these facts in mind we offer the following suggestions.


A Brief Plan for Germany

Rush emergency food supplies to Germany. Raise the base diet to 2,200 calories per person per day immediately, and to 2,500 calories during the winter. Permit the Central Red Cross to function. Remove all limitations to private relief. Organize great drives under the sponsorship of Government, if possible, to provide clothing, fuel, medicines, and other necessities now lacking.

Free all German war prisoners, return them to Germany, and provide them with the tools needed so they can work in Germany to feed and otherwise provide for the German people, and thereby remove a heavy burden from our shoulders. Give all prisoners full union wages for work exacted from them since V-E-Day, to enable them to reestablish themselves and provide for their surviving dependents.

Return all German lands and restore the Reich's 1937 borders. Hold plebiscites in all other territories heavily populated by Germans in 1937, Danzig and Austria included, to determine, in harmony with the Atlantic Charter, under what flag these peoples wish to live.

To relieve the present unbearable population pressure, encourage all countries with low population densities, such as the United States, Canada, Latin America, Australia, and Africa to lower the bars and permit the excess German population to emigrate.

Extend all possible aid to rebuild German cities, restore essential public services, and create decent housing facilities.

Remove all limitations to industrial production and encourage highest possible output (except munitions), in harmony with the thesis that "prosperity, like peace, is indivisible."

Encourage German foreign trade in order to enable the Germans to maintain themselves as soon as possible. Place a value on the mark in terms of other currencies to make private German foreign trade possible. Permit production and operation of commercial airships and ocean-going vessels.

Rehabilitate national finances and forestall inflation by stabilizing the currency. Contract existing currency by calling in outstanding marks and exchanging them for new marks on some such basis as five old for one new, and make all debts and contracts payable in the new marks at the same ratio in place of the old. Let experts decide the exact ratio needed for this operation which will aim to bring the price level down to that of 1937. Thereafter changes in the total supply of means of payment should be made to correspond to changes in national capacity to produce.

Lower taxes to revive incentives and the profit motive.

Remove all limitations on scientific research and invention, with prohibitions continued only in the fields of atomic fission, poison gas, and weapons of war.

Draw up a peace treaty with Germany and officially end the war.

Allow the Germans to set up a unified, central Government of their own choosing, in harmony with the Atlantic Charter, with only such external controls as those mentioned below. Encourage the Germans to frame a Constitution for themselves, with all parties advocating dictatorship or revolution barred from the Constitutional Convention.

Thereupon, withdraw all occupation troops, remove the military governments, and abolish all zones. Continue disarmament permanently, however, and prohibit production of munitions and all weapons of war. To enforce United Nations controls install a system of observation and surprise inspection by roving patrols, permitted to inspect any and all records and activities, and backed by the military might of the United States and other United Nations. Violators to be tried before German courts by Allied prosecutors, with verdicts subject to appeal and retrial, if necessary, before Allied tribunals.

Insist on abolition of all discrimination in favor of displaced persons and others, and make all persons in Germany equal before the law.

Withdraw the reeducation program as gracefully and soon as possible. Replace the general anti-Nazi decrees with specific laws forbidding propagation and advocacy of certain clearly defined and specified ideas or activities, making these prohibitions apply to all alike, including Communists, so that if a certain principle previously advocated by the Nazis and outlawed as socially dangerous, happens also to be advocated by the Communists, the suppression will apply to Communists and all others alike, and not just to former Nazis as at present. Abolish all other edicts establishing political discrimination and give former Nazis a chance to reestablish themselves as productive, respectable, law abiding citizens with full rights. Abolish all censorship and facilitate intercourse between the Germans and the outside world. Permit Germans to travel freely to other countries and citizens of other countries to visit Germany as they wish.

Only by such an example of wisdom and humanity, can we teach the Germans effectively the advantages of our way of life. By advancing such a program and pressing for its acceptance by our allies, we could instantly win the support and sympathy of virtually all Germans. Russia's designs on Germany would be frustrated, war between East and West would be unnecessary, the world would be spared another tragic holocaust.

 

Reference Notes:
[1] Associated Press, Wuerzburg, Germany, March 11, 1946.
[2] Associated Press, Wiesbaden, Germany, April 26, 1946.
[3] Associated Press, Ottawa, Ontario, July 15, 1946.
[4] Lee Hills, Berlin, July 10, 1946, Chicago Daily News Foreign Service.
[5] Willard Edwards, Washington, May 2, 1946, Chicago Tribune Press Service.
[6] Chester Manly, Washington, Aug. 6, 1946, Chicago Tribune Press Service.
[7] David J. Dallin, "Germany Between War and Peace." New Leader (World Events Section), Vol. XXVIII, No. 51, Dec. 22, 1945.
[8] Larry Rue, Prague, Czechoslovakia, Dec. 15, 1945, Chicago Tribune Press Service.
[9] Dorothy Thompson, "Moscow's Plan for Germany," Chicago Daily News, July 18, 1946.
[10] From Henry Morgenthau, Jr., "Morgenthau on Economic Problems," The Chicago Sun, Sept. 12, 13, and 14, 1945.
[11] Associated Press, London, April 5, 1945.
[12] April 7, 1946.
[13] Financial Times, London, May 24, 1946, on report of Swedish Minister of Foreign Trade, M. Gunnar Myrdal.
[14] Cf. Chicago Daily Tribune, April 16, 1946, p. 14.
[15] Associated Press, London, April 6, 1946.
[16] William H. Stoneman, London, Sept. 8, 1945, Chicago Daily News Foreign Service.
[17] The Chicago Sun, (editorial), Sept. 14, 1945, p. 16.
[18] Henry Morgenthau, Germany Is Our Problem (New York: Harper and Bros., 1945), Chapter I (esp. p. 2) and Chapter 8, "Germany Has the Will to Try It Again."
[19] Statement on "The Bretton Woods Agreement," as released by Treasury Dept., pp. 3 and 5.
[20] June 12, 1945, p. 4, of U.S. Treasury press release.
[21] Feb. 14, 1945, p. 2, of U.S. Treasury press release.
[22] Address before Bar Association of the District of Columbia, Dec. 1, 1945, Press Service No. V-148, p. 5.
[23] Before the Lower East Side Citizens Committee, at the Seward Park High School, New York City, April 19, 1945, Press Service No. 45-89, p. 2.
[24] Before New York Chapter, American Society of Chartered Life Underwriters, Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City, Friday, April 20, 1945, Press Service No. 45-91, p. 4.
[25] From Congressional Record, Nov. 16, 1943, pp. 9672 ff.
[26] Col. C.H. Lanza, Chicago Daily Tribune, Sept. 6, 1945.
[27] Chicago Leader, Jan. 10, 1941.
[28] Chicago Herald-American, April 23, 1944, p. 18.
[29]Associated Press, Moscow, March 11, 1939.
[30] Associated Press, Moscow, Sept. 30, 1939.
[31] Harry Elmer Barnes, "Britain's Top War Criminal," The Progressive, Sept. 17, 1945, p. 8.
[32] Congressional Record, June 21, 1944, p. 6429.
[33] Congressional Record, Dec. 8, 1942.
[34] United Press, Washington, Jan. 3, 1941.
[35] Congressional Record, Dec. 11, 1945, p. A-5815.
[36] Associated Press, London, Feb. 10, 1946
[37] David Darrah, London, July 31, 1939, Chicago Tribune Press Service.
[38] Roosevelt and Son, 30 Pine St., N.Y., to Hugh W. Long and Co., 155 Exchange Place, Jersey City, N.J., May 8, 1941.
[39] Mein Kampf (London: Hurst and Blackett, Ltd), p. 125. Cf. also pp. 127, 463, and 520.
[40] Walter Trohan, Washington, Oct. 9, 1945, Chicago Tribune Press Service.

 

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